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I
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
In Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001). § 78-2-2(4) (2001). and § 78-2a3(2)(j) (2001). the Utah Legislature conferred appellate jurisdiction upon the Utah Court
of Appeals to review any appeal resulting from the final order of any Court of record
which is transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. This case involves
the timely appeal by Defendant Pipe Renewal Service, LLC (herein "PRS L L C ) and the
timely Cross-Appeal by Plaintiff Ray Hunting (herein "Ray") from that final order styled,
"Judgment and Final Order'* (herein the "Final Order") which was issued on August 6.
2007, by the Honorable John R. Anderson, Eighth Judicial District Court Judge.
II
A. RE-STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
OF APPELLANT PRS LLC
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ray
respectfully disagrees with PRS LLC's statement of the issues and the standards of
review identified by PRS LLC and therefore restates the issues and provides the
appropriate standards of review as follows:
1.

In light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Development,

LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002), can PRS LLC claim to be a party to an alleged
lease agreement that does not facially identify PRS LLC as a party and thereby require
Ray to name that third party under principles involving joinder of parties?
Standard of Review: Since this issue was raised for the first time on appeal, the
"standard of review'* on this issue is correction of error because there is no decision

below to give deference. Had the joinder issue been raised below, the standard of review
on this issue would be abuse of discretion. See. Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62, ^ 40, 29
P 3d 638.
2.

Did the Trial Court properly exercise its discretion by denying PRS LLC's

Motion to Reconsider entry of Partial Summary Judgment in Ray's favor?
Standard of Review: This standard of review on this issue is abuse of
discretion. A Trial Court's decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider summary
judgment is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d
1381, 1386-7 (Utah 1996); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994).
3.

Did the Trial Court properly award Ray damages in the form of lost rent

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (1994)?
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
with no deference to the Trial Court's decision because it involves an issue of statutory
construction. See, Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc.,
2006 UT 45, H 7, 143P.3d278.
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B. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
OF CROSS-APPELLANT RAY HUNTING
1.

Did the Trial Court err when it refused to treble the damages awarded to

Ray as required by the Unlawful Detainer Statute set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10
(1994)? This issue was preserved below at R. 139-40; R. 161-62; R. 636-638; R. 640644.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
with no deference to the Trial Court's decision because it involves an issue of statutory
construction. Lysenko v. Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, ^|23. 7 P.3d 783; Fowler v. Setter, 838
P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
2.

Did the Trial Court err by repeatedly declining to grant Ray's Motion for

Summary Judgment on the issue of general damages where PRS LLC failed to properly
dispute/contest the accuracy/amount of Ray's general damage claim? This issue was
preserved below at R. 139-40; R. 161-62; R. 302-320; R. 559-561; R. 578.
Standard of Review: The standard of review on this issue is correction of error
with no deference to the Trial Court's decision because it involves a legal issue.
Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, 156P.3d 175: Estate Landscape and Snow
Removal v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 844 P.2d 322 (Utah 1992).
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Ill
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUES, AND RULES
Pursuant to Rules 24(a)(6) and 24(a)( 11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Ray has concurrently submitted an Addendum that contains the following
applicable constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules, to-wit:
1.

Determinative Statutory Provisions:
A.

The Unlawful Detainer Statute including the following/pertinent

provisions;
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vii)

Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Code Ann.
Code Ann.
Code Ann.
Code Ann.
Code Ann.
Code Ann.

§ 78-36-3( 1) (1992)
§ 78-36-6 (1997) & (2007)
§ 78-36-7 (1992)
§ 78-36-8.5 (1987)
§ 78-36-10 (1994) & (2007)
§ 78-36-12.3 (1981)

The foregoing statutory provisions are attached as Exhibit A & B to the Addendum.
2.

The pertinent rules are as follows:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Rule 7 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 8 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 12 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 19 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 20 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 54 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 56 Ut.R.Civ.P.
Rule 24 Ut.R.App.P.

The foregoing rules are attached as Exhibit C to the Addendum.
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IV
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Case Nature, Course, Proceedings and Disposition
1.

Nature of the Case: Ray is the landlord of certain real property located at

5500 East 5750 South, Vernal, Utah (herein "the Property"). R. 72; R.167. Prior to
August 15, 2005, Pipe Renewal Service, LLC (herein "PRS LLC") occupied and rented
the Property from Ray on a month-to-month basis and paid monthly rent in the sum of
$2,000.00. R. 168-179. On August 15, 2005, Ray caused a written notice to be served
upon the registered agent of PRS LLC, William L. Lauf, wherein Ray timely notified PRS
LLC that its monthly rent would increase to the sum of $7,500.00, effective September 1,
2005 (herein the wtRent Increase Notice''). R. 165; R. 167. Despite its receipt of the Rent
Increase Notice, PRS LLC only paid $2,000.00 in rent each month for the months of
September of 2005 through December of 2006 and did not comply with the Rent Increase
Notice. R. 156;R. 165; R. 178.
Prior to August 1, 2005, Ray had not received any rent payments or notice from
any other person or entity in which said person or entity asserted any right/claim to rent or
lease the Property. R. 156; R. 178. No other person or entity other than PRS LLC paid
rent to Ray for the possession, occupancy and/or use of the Property commencing with
August of 2005 through December of 2006. R. 156; R. 178; R. 625-628. No other
person, or entity under the control of PRS LLC sought to intervene in the litigation below
for the purpose of claiming any tenancy, interest, or right(s) to the Property. R. 165-166;
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R. 178.
On September 16. 2005. Ray caused a wcThree Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate"
(herein the 'Three Day Notice") to be served upon Mr. Lauf as registered agent for PRS
LLC as a result of its failure/refusal to pay the increased rent specified in the Rent
Increase Notice. R. 165: R. 177. Ray filed the lawsuit below as an action for unlawful
detainer seeking an order of restitution and award of unpaid increased rent and treble
damages. R. 59-69.
2.

Course of the Proceedings Below: On September 21, 2006, Ray filed his

Motion for Summary Judgment (herein tcRay's SJ Motion") supported by the Affidavit of
Ray Hunting dated September 19, 2006 (herein "Ray's SJ Affidavit"). R. 138-140; R.
168-179. On September 22, 2006, PRS LLC filed its Motion to Dismiss. R. 180-181.
On November 1, 2006, the Honorable John R. Anderson, in the Eighth Judicial District
Court, entered his Ruling and Order granting, in part, Ray's Motion for Summary
Judgment (herein "SJ Ruling"), finding PRS LLC in unlawful detainer of the Property
and denying PRS LLCs Motion to Dismiss.1 In Judge Anderson's SJ Ruling, he reserved
the amount of Ray's damages for further hearing. R. 340-343; R. 840-843.
On November 7, 2006, Judge Anderson issued Ray's Order of Restitution ordering
PRS LLC to vacate the premises within ten (10) days after service. R. 364-365. On

1. At page 4 of PRS LLC's Brief it claims that the Trial Court treated its Motion to
Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment. PRS LLC's assertion is erroneous because
under Rule 12(b) Ut.R.Civ.P., the Trial Court properly "exclude[ed] the lease agreement,
and...treat[ed] the motion as a motion to dismiss.'* R. 341.
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November 9. 2006, Judge Anderson issued an Order striking the Ray's Order of
Restitution based on Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 353. On
November 14. 2006. PRS LLC filed its Motion to Reconsider which was accompanied by
a supporting Memorandum and Affidavit. R. 369-388. Counsel for Ray subsequently reserved Ray^s Order of Restitution and submitted it to Judge Anderson for consideration
on December 21, 2006, after PRS LLC filed an objection on November 30. 2007. R. 584588. On January 8, 2007, Judge Anderson issued a Ruling advising the parties to be
prepared to address Ray's Order of Restitution at oral argument, which Oral Argument
was scheduled for January 30, 2007. R. 594-598. At the conclusion of oral argument.
Judge Anderson issued his ruling from the bench granting Ray's Order of Restitution as
to PRS LLC and providing the parties fifteen (15) days in which to present evidence to
the Court in the form of an appraisal of the Property regarding the amount of a bond upon
which it would be willing to stay the Order of Restitution. R. 872 at p. 33-38. The
following day. in the Court's Ruling and Order dated February 1, 2007, the Court sua
sponte amended its ruling from the bench and declined to enter Ray's Order of Restitution
astoPRSLLC. R. 594-599.
In Judge Anderson's February 1, 2007, Ruling and Order (herein "Reconsideration
Ruling'*), the Trial Court denied Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed its
prior SJ Ruling. R. 598-599. Again, Judge Anderson reserved the amount of damages to
be determined at a future hearing. R. 595.
Pursuant to the Court's Reconsideration Ruling, Ray submitted his Motion to
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Award Damages and For Entry of Final Judgment on May 2. 2007 (herein

wt

Ray's

Damages Motion'*), which was supported by the Affidavits of Ray Hunting, his counsel
Phillip W. Dyer, and Paul W. Throndsen. MAI. R. 600-709 [sic].2 In the MAI appraisal
conducted by Mr. Throndsen, he opined that the current fair market rental value of the
Property to be $13,450.00 per month and the fair market value of the Property to be
$1,600,000.00. R. 707. Although PRS LLC attempted to discredit Mr. Throndsen's
appraisal, it did not present any expert opinion in opposition thereto. R. 741-768. In
Judge Anderson's Ruling dated July 2, 2007, he awarded Ray his damages for the
difference between the $2,000.00 in monthly rent paid by PRS LLC, and the $7,500.00
per month in rent specified in the Rent Increase Notice, but did not award Ray any treble
damages under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (1994). R. 817-822; R. 840-843.
3.

Disposition Below: The Honorable John R. Anderson awarded Ray

damages in his favor and against PRS LLC in the form of unpaid increased rent totaling
$88,000.00, and costs of $174.50 but did not award Ray treble damages under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-10 (1994). R. 840-843.
B.

Statement of Facts.

(i)
The uncontested facts as set forth in Ray's SJ Motion, which were
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 7(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.
342-343):
1.

Ray is the Landlord of certain real property located at 5500 East 5750

2_ There appears to be a clerical error in the page numbering of the record. The pages
numbered 700 through 749 are duplicated in the record.
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South, Vernal, Utah (herein "the Property"), which real property is located in Uintah
County, State of Utah. This fact is admitted in PRS LLC's Answer to Amended
Complaint for Eviction dated June 30, 2006 (herein "PRS LLC's Answer") at paragraph
2. R. 72; R. 167.
2.

Prior to August 16, 2005, PRS LLC occupied and rented the Property from

Ray on a month-to-month basis and paid monthly rent in the sum of $2,000.00. See,
Affidavit of Ray Hunting dated September 19, 2006 (herein

ww

Ray's SJ Affidavit") at K 3.

R. 166; R. 168-179.
3.

On August 16, 2005, Ray caused a written notice to be served upon the

registered agent of PRS LLC, William L. Lauf, in which Ray timely notified PRS LLC
that PRS LLC's monthly rent would increase to the sum of $7,500.00, effective with the
monthly rent due on September 1, 2005. Said notice specifically identified that it was
regarding "Notice of Rent Increase Effective September 1, 2005." (herein the "Rent
Increase Notice"). A true and correct copy of the Rent Increase Notice is attached to
Ray's SJ Affidavit as Exhibit A. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at U 4. R. 166; R. 168-179.
4.

Prior to August 1, 2005, Ray did not receive any notice from any other

person or entity in which said person or entity has asserted any right/claim to rent or lease
the Property. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at U 5. R. 166; R. 178.
5.

No other person or entity other than PRS LLC paid rent to Ray for the

possession, occupancy and/or use of the Property commencing with August of 2005
through the date of Ray's SJ Affidavit. R.156; R. 166; R. 178. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at
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U 6; Deposition of William Lauf dated July 3 L 2006 (herein "Lauf Deposition'*) at page
77 and Exhibit 3 thereto. No other person or entity under the control of PRS LLC or Mr.
Lauf sought to intervene in the lawsuit below for the purpose of claiming any tenancy or
interest in the Property. R. 165-166: R. 178.
6.

Despite its receipt of the Rent Increase Notice, PRS LLC only paid

$2,000.00 in rent each month for the months of September of 2005 through September of
2006 and did not comply with the Rent Increase Notice. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at f 7;
See, Lauf Deposition at Exhibit 3 thereto. R. 156; R. 165; R. 178.
7.

On or about September 16. 2005, Ray caused a 'Three Day Notice to Pay

Rent or Vacate" (herein the 'Three Day Notice") to be served upon William L. Lauf as
registered agent for PRS LLC due to PRS LLC's failure/refusal to pay the increased rent
specified in the Rent Increase Notice. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at U 8 and Exhibit B. R.
165; R. 177.
8.

PRS LLC did not comply with the Three Day Notice by paying the sums

due and owing as stated therein or by vacating the Property [prior to December 31, 2006].
PRS LLC was in unlawful detainer of the Property [at the time the Court granted Ray's SJ
Motion] by retaining possession and use of the Property without payment of the increased
monthly rent due and owing after September 1, 2005. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at f 9. R.
165; R. 177.
9.

As of the filing of Ray's SJ Motion, PRS LLC was indebted to Ray in the
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sum of $71,500.00/ which represented accrued and unpaid increased monthly rent for the
months of September of 2005. through September of 2006, totaling $97,500.00 less the
sum of $26,000.00 previously paid by Defendant. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at H 10. R.
165; R. 176-177.
(ii)
The following additional facts were presented to the Trial Court in
Ray's Damages Motion and were unopposed by PRS LLC below:
10.

On November 1. 2006. the Trial Court entered its SJ Ruling granting Ray's

SJ Motion, determining that PRS LLC was in unlawful detainer of the Property. R. 340343; R. 646. The Court reserved the amount of damages for further hearing as follows:
"Because the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to
increase rent and because the Defendant [PRS LLC]
concedes receiving notice of the rent increase and failing to
pay the increased amount, and because the Plaintiff served the
Defendant with a notice to vacate, and because the Defendant
did not pay the increased rent and did not vacate, the Court
can lawfully conclude that the Defendant is in unlawful
detainer of the subject property. Therefore, the Court will
grant Plaintiffs Motion for summary judgment. However,
the Court is concerned with the amount of damages as
calculated by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court will order that
a hearing be held on the issue of damages." SJ Ruling dated
November 1, 2006 at page 2-3 (emphasis supplied). R. 340343; R. 646.
11.

On February L 2007, the Trial Court entered its Reconsideration Ruling

denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and upholding its prior SJ Ruling
granting Ray's SJ Motion. R. 594-599; R. 645. Again, the Court reserved the amount of

3. As a result of PRS LLC's attempts to delay entry of judgment, the final unpaid rent
figure increased to $88,000.00. R. 817-822; R. 840-843. See, Ray's Argument 1A
hereinbelow at p. 38-39 for a full explanation.

11

damages to be determined at a future hearing as follows:
'Therefore, the Court concludes as follows. The rights of
PRS. LLC have been adjudicated, the Court finding that PRS,
LLC was lawfully served with an increase in rent. Failing to
pay the increase in rent, the Plaintiff brought suit against the
LLC for unlawful detainer. The Court's order granting
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment effectively
adjudicated the rights of the Plaintiff against the LLC. ...
Finally, the issue of Plaintiffs damages resulting from PRS,
LLC's unlawful detainer will be reserved for future hearing."
Reconsideration Ruling dated February 1, 2007, at pages 4-5
(emphasis supplied). R. 594-599; R. 645.
12.

During the January 30, 2007, oral argument in this matter, the Court

expressed concern regarding the amount of damages in this matter and suggested that the
parties obtain real estate appraisals to assist the Court in determining the amount of a
possession bond (now moot)4 as well as the fair market rental value of the Property in
question. R. 872 at p. 33-38. Accordingly, Ray arranged to have an appraisal of the
Property performed by Paul W. Throndsen, MAI. In the MAI appraisal conducted by Mr.
Throndsen, he valued the then current fair market rental value of the Property to be
$13,450.00 per month and the fair market value of the property to be $1,600,000.00. See,
Affidavit of Mr. Throndsen dated April 30, 2007, and the Appraisal Report attached as
Exhibit B thereto. R. 600-709; R. 644-645.

4. As a matter of caution, Ray's counsel raised a third issue regarding the denial of Ray's
Writ of Restitution in its Docketing Statement. However, the issue is now moot because
PRS LLC has vacated the Property and Ray hereby withdraws that argument.
12

IV
A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ON APPELLANT PRS LLC'S APPEAL
POINT I: The Trial Court properly granted Ray's SJ Motion against Defendant PRS
LLC under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 (1992) and Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook.
2002 UT 38, ^53, 48 P.3d 895, because PRS Corporation5 was not a necessary and
indispensable party. Furthermore, Defendant PRS LLC failed to present any competent
evidence that PRS Corporation was in actual possession of the Property at the time of the
commencement of the unlawful detainer action as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7
(1992).
POINT II: PRS LLC failed to present or raise any genuine issue of material fact in
opposition to Ray's SJ Motion, which Motion was properly supported by Ray's SJ
Affidavit dated September 19, 2006, and portions of the Lauf deposition dated July 31,
2006, and was unopposed by PRS LLC. The alleged lease agreement between Ray and a
third party, PRS Corporation, is insufficient as a matter of law to create a genuine issue of
material fact because it was irrelevant to the dispute between the parties litigant. The
Trial Court properly exercised its discretion under Rule 54(b) to deny PRS LLC's Motion
for Reconsideration despite the tardy Affidavit of William Lauf dated November 14,
2006.

5. The alleged lease agreement is between Ray and a third party, Pipe Renewal Service
Inc. (herein "PRS Corporation").
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POINT III: In the Unlawftil Detainer Statute at Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (1994). the
Utah Legislature has mandated the assessment of damages in the amount of rent due
where the unlawful detainer is after default in the payment in rent. It is undisputed that
PRS LLC was in unlawful detainer of the Property. Based on the plain language of the
Unlawful Detainer Statute, damages in the form of unpaid rent are appropriate and
statutorily required.
B. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ON CROSS APPELLANT RAY HUNTING'S APPEAL
POINT I: The Trial Court erred by refusing to treble the damages awarded to Hunting
under the Unlawful Detainer Statute. Our Utah Legislature in Utah Code Ann. § 78-3610(3)( 1994) has mandated treble damages in an unlawful detainer action. The Trial Court
erroneously refused to treble Ray's damages on the ground that there may possibly be a
third party in possession of the premises. The Trial Court's reasoning is in error because
the unlawful detainer statute mandates trebled damages where the party appearing in the
proceeding is found to be in unlawful detainer of the premises.
POINT II: The Trial Court erred by twice reserving the issue of damages when it
granted Ray's SJ Motion determining PRS LLC was in unlawful detainer of the Property
because PRS LLC did not dispute or present any competent evidence to factually dispute
Ray's claims for damages.
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ARGUMENT ON APPELLANT PRS LLC'S APPEAL
I
PRS LLC'S JOINDER ARGUMENT FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
A. In Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 (1992), the Legislature has statutorily precluded the
dismissal of an unlawful detainer action for an alleged failure to join a necessary
party defendant.
Although PRS LLC maintains that it raised the issue of failure to join an
indispensable party below, PRS LLC raised the issue for the first time on appeal.6
Despite PRS LLC's failure to preserve the issue below, its failure is not fatal because this
Court has previously held that the indispensable party issue can be raised for the first time

6. None of the four (4) citations to the record in PRS LLC's Brief at page 1, demonstrate
that it preserved the joinder issue for appeal, specifically raise the issue, and/or that the
issue was supported with evidence or relevant legal authority. See, Hatch v. Davis, 2004
UT App 378 156, 102 P.3d 774. PRS LLC's first citation to R. 377 is page 2 from the
Affidavit of William Lauf in Support of [PRS LLC's] Motion to Reconsider dated
November 14, 2006. Mr. Lauf s Affidavit did not raise the joinder issue and even,
assuming arguendo, it did the Utah Court of Appeals has previously noted in State v.
Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1003, fn. 5 (Utah Ct.App. 1993), that it is improper to
raise legal arguments in an affidavit.
PRS LLC's second citation to R. 481-482, is Exhibit A to PRS LLC's Reply
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reconsider. However, nowhere in PRS LLC's
Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Reconsider does it even discuss the
joinder issue. PRS LLC's third citation to R. 577-580, is Judge Anderson's January 8,
2007, Ruling and is therefore legally insufficient to meet PRS LLC's obligation to raise
an issue. Finally, PRS LLC cites to R. 715-717, which is a portion of PRS LLC's Reply
Memorandum in Support of its belated Motion for Summary Judgment [regarding the
award of damages] that was submitted over six (6) months after the SJ Ruling. This
Court has repeatedly held that issues raised for the first time in reply memoranda are not
properly before the Court. See, State v. Phathammavong at 1004; Coleman v. Stevens,
2000 UT 98, ^|9, 17 P.3d 1122 (refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in a
reply brief and holding that issues were deemed waived).
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on appeal. See, Cassidy v. Salt Lake County Civil Service Council 1999 UT App 65. ^|9,
976 P.2d 607.
In Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 (1992). our Utah Legislature provided that:
c

78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the
premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a
party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the
plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who
might have been made a party defendant; but when it appears
that any of the parties served with process of appearing in the
proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against
o

those parties." (1992) (Emphasis supplied).
7. PRS LLC has not pointed this Court to one shred of competent record evidence that
PRS Corporation was in "actual occupation of the premises when the action [was]
commenced." It is undisputed that PRS LLC is the only entity that paid rent to Ray for
over two (2) years prior to the commencement of this action and was therefore the tenant
of the Property. R. 156; R. 165-166; R. 178. Ray properly served A Rent Increase Notice
and a subsequent Three Day Notice on PRS LLC. R. 165; R. 177. Neither PRS LLC nor
any other person or entity responded to the Three Day Notice prior to the filing of this
lawsuit. R. 165; R. 177. Had PRS Corporation been in actual occupation of the Property,
it could and should have notified Ray of the same and taken any necessary steps to
preserve its rights, if any. by seeking to intervene in the proceedings below.
8. In 2007, the Utah Legislature amended § 78-36-7 to include a requirement that a
"lease signer" be made a party defendant in unlawful detainer proceedings as follows:
"78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant.
No person other than the tenant of the premises, a lease signer, and
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the
action is commenced, shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding,
except as provided in Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor
the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have
been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties
served with process or apprearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment
shall be rendered against those parties.'" Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 (2007)
(2007 changes identified by underlining)
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PRS LLC, not PRS Corporation, has at all times relevant herein paid the only
(partial) rent that Ray has received during the proceedings below. R. 243 at ^J5; R. 62 at
T|7. In the absence of a written lease to the Property between Ray and PRS LLC, PRS
LLC's tenancy constitutes a month-to-month tenancy under the statute of frauds.

When

The 2007 amendment to the Unlawful Detainer statute is inapplicable to this action
because this action was filed in 2005 and substantive statutory amendments are not
retroactively effective. See, Thomas v. Color Country Management, 2004 UT 12, ^36, 84
P.3d 1201 (stating (1) the presumption in Utah that legislative amendments are
substantive changes, and (2) the general rule against retroactive application of statutes in
Utah). Assuming, arguendo, the 2007 amendment applied, PRS Corporation would still
not be a necessary party defendant because the tenancy that was sued on was a month-tomonth arrangement between Ray and PRS LLC and not the alleged written lease with
PRS Corporation.
9. PRS LLC does not argue in its Brief that it is an assignee of the alleged written lease
nor that it was a subtenant of PRS Corporation. An agreement to lease real property for
more than one (1) year is subject to the statute of frauds and must be in writing. See,
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953). Further, the statute of frauds prohibits an oral
assignment of a lease for a term of more than one (1) year. See, Utah Mercur Gold
Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 134 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1943) (holding oral
agreement to extend lease is subject to the statute of frauds). Thus, PRS LLC is not
entitled to the benefit of any alleged written lease between Ray and PRS Corporation in
the absence of a written agreement effecting an assignment of the same - more
importantly, no such assignment exists nor was one proffered or contained in the record
of the proceedings below.
10. The statue of frauds clearly provides that an agreement to lease real property, in
excess of one (1) year, is void if it is not written and signed:
"§ 25-5-3. Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall
be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is
in writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be
made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."
(1953)
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PRS LLC failed to pay increased rent when due (R. 165: R. 177). Ray properly complied
with the terms of the Unlawful Detainer statute (R.165; R. 177; R. 340-343). and the Trial
Court properly entered judgment against PRS LLC and in Rays favor (R. 340-343).
In opposition to Ray's SJ Motion, PRS LLC argued that it was entitled to the rights
and benefits of the alleged written lease with a third party, PRS Corporation. R. 275; R.
276; R. 278. However, the Trial Court properly ruled that the alleged written lease with a
third party, PRS Corporation, was not relevant to the unlawful detainer action herein
because PRS LLC is not a party to the alleged written lease and does not have standing to
enforce the same because PRS LLC is a separate legal entity from PRS Corporation.
Thus, unless a party is an identified third party beneficiary to a lease/contract, the Utah
Supreme Court has clearly held that separate legal entities are not bound by, or entitled to
the benefit of, the contractual obligations/rights of another. n Accordingly, a breach of
contract claim can only be maintained as between the parties to that contract. See,
Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, % 53, 48 P.3d 895. PRS LLC, thus has
no standing to assert the alleged written lease with PRS Corporation as a defense to Ray's
Amended Complaint.

Further, where there is no valid written lease, the Utah Supreme Court has held the
tenancy to be on a month-to-month basis. See, Greenwood v. Jackson, 128 P.2d 282
(Utah 1942) (holding lease that was void in contravention of the statute of frauds created
a month-to-month tenancy).
11. PRS LLC attempted to confuse this issue by repeatedly referring in its memoranda
below to "Pipe Renewal Service" and failing to distinguish between PRS LLC and the
third party PRS Corporation.
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In Holmes Development, LLC, Plaintiff Holmes Development, LLC. sued on a
contract between Holmes Ventures, LC and Cook Development. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff Holmes Development,
LLC, because the lawsuit was predicated on a contract between the defendant and a
separate limited liability company - Holmes Ventures, LC. The Utah Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's dismissal reasoning that although a related entity. Holmes
Ventures, LC, was facially identified as the party to the contract. Holmes Development,
LLC could not maintain an action for breach because only the parties to the contract can
sue (and be sued) under the contract in dispute. As Justice Russon noted in the Court's
unanimous decision:
"Generally, unless a plaintiff can recover on a contract as a
third-party beneficiary or an assignee, only parties to a
contract can bring, suit under the contract. See SME Indus.,
Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001
UT 54, H 10, 28 P 3 d 669; Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council,
Inc., 1999 UT 34, \ 20, 976 P.2d 1213; M.H. Walker Realty
Co. v. Am. Sur. Co., 60 Utah 435, 450, 211 P. 998. 1004
(1922). Holmes was not specifically a party to either the
indemnity agreement or the modification and extension
agreement. Holmes Ventures, LC, not Holmes Development,
LLC, [FN6] was the party to both of these agreements.
Assuming Cook and Cook Development were liable under the
indemnity agreement and the modification and extension
agreement, Holmes would not be able to sue to recover. See
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-l 10(1) (Supp.2001) (Providing that
limited liability company can "institute . . .any action . . .in its
own name" (emphasis added)). Therefore, Holmes cannot
pursue these claims against Cook or Cook Development.
FN6. It may be that Holmes Development, LLC, and Holmes
Ventures, LC, have the same management and may be
practically indistinguishable. However, the two are legally
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separate entities and were created as separate entities for a
purpose. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-402 (Supp.2001).
Therefore, we refuse to recognize them as the same entity for
standing to sue on a contract." Holmes Development, LLC v.
Cook, 2002 UT 38.1|53. 48 P.3d 895 (Emphasis supplied).
On the face of the alleged written lease, PRS Corporation, not PRS LLC, is a party
to that alleged written lease. PRS LLC. like Holmes Development. LLC. is thus not a
party to the alleged written lease and thus lacks standing to assert any rights under the
same. Significantly, PRS Corporation, did not file a motion to intervene in this action
below,

presumably because it has abandoned

the alleged lease and/or had no legally

12. The fatal flaw to the PRS LLC's argument is that PRS Corporation did not make any
rental payments for over two (2) years and thus abandoned the alleged lease, and would
therefore be unable to assert any rights under the alleged lease in any event. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that PRS Corporation had knowledge of the unlawful
detainer action but did not make any efforts to intervene. See, In Re Discipline of Alex,
2004 UT 81, U 27-28, 99 P.3d 865, 870 (holding a landlord with a contingent interest in
attorney/tenant's property is permitted under rule 24 Ut.R.Civ.P. upon timely application
to intervene in an action - including a disciplinary action). PRS Corporation's registered
agent is William L. Lauf, the same registered agent of PRS LLC. R. 378. If PRS
Corporation desired to seek leave from the Trial Court to be joined as a party under Rule
20 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it should have done so. In fact, during the January
30, 2007, hearing Judge Anderson invited PRS LLC's counsel to have PRS Corporation
intervene as a party, to wit:
"3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Mr. Sam: Your Honor. I sill have a question with
respect to Pipe Renewal Management Inc.'s interest here. Your
Honor did order that he be joined as a party. If the order that
the incorporation filed its pleading - I'm a little confused as
to what should happen there.
Mr. Dyer: Your Honor. I didn't read the court's ruling
as to saying that. It said the court was prepared to, but I
don't know that the court has.
The Court: I didn't order them to be joined, but I
thought it would be a good idea. But that's up to you, Mr. Sam.
Mr. Sam: Okay.
20

enforceable interest in the lease or the Property.14

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

The Court: You may want - you know - you may not want
to. You may want to file a new case. I don't know. Fm not
going to tell you what to do.
Mr. Sam: Fll talk to Mr. Lauf
The Court: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Sam: Thank you.
Mr. Dyer: May we be excused?
The Court: You may.
Mr. Dyer: Thank you.
(Whereupon another matter was heard.)'' R. 871atp.40. (Emphasis
supplied)

PRS Corporation did not move to intervene in the proceedings below.
13. The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act provides that abandonment is statutorily
presumed where:
"(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations:
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days
after the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than
the presence of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is
occupying the premises; or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be
absent from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when
due and the tenant's personal property has been removed from
the dwelling unit and there is no reasonable evidence that the
tenant is occupying the premises." U.C.A. §78-36-12.3 (1981).
There was no evidence before the Trial Court below that PRS Corporation paid rent
when due. Thus, there appears to be a presumption that PRS Corporation had abandoned
the alleged lease agreement.
14. An agreement to lease real property for more than one (1) year is subject to the
statute of frauds and must be in writing. See, fn. 10 at p. 17-18 hereinabove. Further, the
statute of frauds prohibits an oral assignment of a lease for a term of more than one (1)
year. See, Utah Mereur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining Co., 134 P.2d 1094
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Firstly, PRS LLC cites the case of Bonneville Tower Condominium Management
Committee v. Thompson Michie Assos. Inc.. 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986) in support of its
joinder argument. Bonneville is, however, easily distinguishable from the case at bar
because it does not involve an unlawful detainer action but, rather, involved a dispute
between condominium owners and the developer regarding common areas in the
development. In Bonneville, the Court dismissed the action for failure to join the
purchasers/owners of the common areas as necessary parties to the action. Given PRS
LLC's subsequent vacating of the premises (R. 664; R. 821), Ray did not ultimately ask
the Court to adjudicate the rights of PRS Corporation but simply requested entry of final
judgment against PRS LLC so that appropriate collection efforts could be pursued. Ray
submits that Bonneville is simply irrelevant to the issue at bar.
II
PRS LLC FAILED TO RAISE A GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING
THE GRANTING OF RAY'S SJ MOTION
A. The Trial Court correctly determined that PRS LLC failed to properly raise a
genuine issue of material fact that would have precluded the granting of Ray's SJ
Motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ut.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The
Utah Supreme Court has noted the standard of review on a motion for summary judgment
is as follows:
(Utah 1943) (holding oral agreement to extend lease is subject to the statute of frauds).
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"We review the trial courf s summary judgment for correctness,
considering only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed.
See, e.g., Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, 2000 UT 71, Tj 14,
10 P.3d 338. Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Id. When we review a grant of
summary judgment, "we view the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party/* Id. at U 15." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,1 10,48
P.3d235.
Ray's SJ Motion was properly supported by a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities and an Affidavit of Ray Hunting dated September 19, 2006 (herein "Ray's SJ
Affidavit"). R. 168-179. In response, PRS LLC filed a memorandum in opposition
(herein "PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum"), with a copy of the alleged lease agreement with
PRS Corporation attached as Exhibit "A" thereto. PRS LLC did not submit any
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits in opposition to Ray's SJ
Motion. R. 343. Because Ray's SJ Motion was properly supported by adequate proof,
the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes a party (such as PRS LLC) from opposing a Motion for Summary
Judgment in reliance merely on general denials of allegations in its pleadings. Instead,
the opponent (PRS LLC) has an affirmative duty to respond with admissible evidence in
the form of affidavits, interrogatory answers, or deposition transcripts, in order to
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substantively controvert15 Ray's statement of facts, to-wit:

15. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides that:
"[E]ach fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding party.'' Id.
(Emphasis supplied)
PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum was not accompanied by any affidavits, interrogatory
answers or deposition transcripts and the Statement of Facts contained in Ray's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities (in their entirety) were therefore deemed
admitted as true and correct for the purpose of adjudicating the merits of Ray's SJ
Motion. R.342. See also, D & L Supply v. Sauriniu, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989):
Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987).
Further, Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
"controverting'^ a movant's statement of facts means:
"the opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute,
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.'*
Id. (Emphasis supplied).
In Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, U12, 156 P.3d 175, this Court recently
upheld a trial court's award of summary judgment where the opposing party failed to
comply with Rule 7 Ut.R.Civ.P. as follows:
"Defendants* opposing memorandum fails to substantially comply with rule
7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants' failure amounts to
more than a technical violation of the rule. Defendants do not provide an explanation
of the basis for any dispute, nor do they provide appropriate supporting citations.
Rather, Defendants' opposing memorandum contains only a separate statement of
additional facts and a list of facts deemed disputed without further explanation or
support. As a result, Defendants' opposing memorandum does not controvert each of
Plaintiffs facts. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it enforced rule 7(c)(3)(B) by deeming Plaintiffs facts to be
admitted. We affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment." Id.
Although the Trial Court did not have the benefit of the Bluffdale City decision when
it issued its SJ Ruling or Reconsideration Ruling on February 1, 2007, the same provides
further supporting grounds to affirm the Trial Court's SJ Ruling.
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"When a motion for summary judgment is filed and supported
by an affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an
affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials
allowed by rule 56(e).
[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not
so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224,
226-27 (Utah 1983); Thorncock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934. 936
(Utah 1979)." D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421
(Utah 1989) (Emphasis supplied).
The Utah Supreme Court has further held that the trial court may properly
conclude there are no genuine issues of material fact where the opposing party (PRS
LLC) fails to file any responsive affidavit(s) or other admissible evidence:
'The language of this rule [56(e)] is clear. Indeed, we have
previously held: [Wjhen a party opposes a properly supported
motion for summary judgment and fails to file any responsive
affidavits or other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule
56(e), the trial court may properly conclude that there are no
genuine issues of fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit
affirmatively discloses the existing of such an issue. Without
such a showing, the Court need only decide whether, on the
basis of the applicable law, the moving party is entitled to
judgment." Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). (Emphasis supplied).
Although PRS LLC would now like to belatedly attempt to dispute Ray's
statements of fact,16 PRS LLC's unsupported and conclusory statements are not supported

16. Id. Further, not only did PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum fail to restate any of Ray's
statements of fact, it was also wholly unsupported by any admissible evidence, i.e.
affidavits, depositions, or interrogatory answers.
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by citation to any affidavit(s). record evidence or deposition testimony, whatsoever.
Accordingly, Ray's Statement of Facts were properly deemed admitted for the purposes
of determining Ray's SJ Motion.
Notwithstanding PRS LLC's protestations to the contrary, the Trial Court did
consider the alleged lease agreement with PRS Corporation incident to granting and
affirming Ray's SJ Motion and properly ruled that it was insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact. R. 342. Under Holmes Development the Trial Court correctly
ruled that PRS LLC is not a party to that alleged lease agreement and PRS LLC is
therefore not entitled to the benefit of the same. Whether there may. or may not, be an
enforceable lease agreement with PRS Corporation does not create a material issue of
fact

in this case because PRS LLC is not entitled to the benefit of a third party's

contract.19 See, Holmes Development at ^[53. In PRS LLC's Brief, it "claims only to be a

17. See, Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973)
(conclusory statements unsupported by facts are inadmissible in considering a motion for
summary judgment); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747. 748 (Utah 1985).
18. See, Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (Although facts before the
court are considered in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, an issue of fact
must be material to the dispute at issue to preclude summary judgment).
19. PRS LLC's SJ Memorandum argued that PRS LLC was a party to the alleged lease
agreement and that it was entitled to the rights and benefits of the alleged lease
agreement. R. 275. It was not until after the Court's SJ Ruling and in PRS LLC's
Motion for Reconsideration that PRS LLC changed its position and tried to argue that
PRS LLC was entitled to the rights and benefits of the alleged lease agreement and that
PRS LLC's use and occupation of the Property was subject to PRS Corporation's alleged
lease agreement. R. 385-386.
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temporary third party beneficiary'^ of an allegedly enforceable lease
Property.

regarding the

However. PRS LLC, not PRS Corporation, has at all times relevant herein

paid the only (partial) rent that Ray received for the Property.
Furthermore, the Trial Court is only required to consider fair inferences from the
facts in support of the party opposing summary judgment:
". . . [Rjeciting all facts and fair inferences drawn from the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Nevertheless,
where the movant supports a motion for summary judgment with
affidavits or other sworn evidence, the nonmoving party may not rely
20. One of the fatal flaws to PRS LLC's argument is that the alleged Lessee (PRS
Corporation) did not make any rental payments for over two (2) years and therefore
abandoned the alleged lease. Thus, even if PRS LLC is/was a "temporary third party
beneficiary," it would be unable to assert any rights under the alleged lease. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that PRS Corporation has had knowledge (through its
agent - William L. Lauf) of the proceedings below but did not make any efforts to
intervene. See, In Re Discipline of Alex, 2004 UT 8L 1 99 P.3d 865, 870 (holding a
landlord with a contingent interest in attorney/tenant's property is permitted under rule 24
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. upon timely application to intervene in an action - including a disciplinary
action).
21. Significantly, PRS LLC's Answer to Ray's Amended Complaint does not allege that
there is an enforceable written lease agreement between the parties. Nor does PRS LLC's
Answer assert the alleged lease agreement as constituting an affirmative defense to Ray's
Amended Complaint. R. 70-73. Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Ut.R.Civ.Pro., require all
affirmative defenses (including any that constitute an avoidance) to be asserted in the
answer or the defense is deemed waived. In Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah
CtApp. 1992), this Court held that although the landlord's failure to obtain the Court's
endorsement on summons in a forcible entry/unlawful detainer action gave rise to an
insufficiency of process defense but the tenant waived this defense when he failed to raise
the defense in his Answer and his attempt to raise the defense when the landlord moved
for treble damages was too late. It thus appears PRS LLC could not assert the alleged
lease as an affirmative defense had this case proceeded to trial.
22. See, Ray's Amended Complaint U 7, Ray's SJ Affidavit at T|s 3, 6. R. 59-69; R. 156;
R. 166; R. 178.
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on bare allegations from the pleadings to raise a dispute of fact.
Accordingly, an allegation in a pleading has no effect on our view of
the facts if it is controverted by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions on file, affidavits, other admissible
evidence in the record. If a motion for summary judgment is
supported by these types of evidence, in order to raise a dispute of
fact, a nonmoving party must use evidence from these same types of
sources." Poteet v. White. 2006 UT 63, ^ 7, 147 P.3d 439 (Emphasis
supplied).
In Poteet, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously upheld Judge Mower's grant of
summary judgment where the party opposing summary judgment did not present any
admissible evidence that would create a material factual dispute. The plaintiff, Greg
Poteet, sued his neighbor, William White, for damage to his property and sawmill arising
out of a fire that spread from White's property. Poteet alleged in his complaint that the
fire was started by White's independent contractor, Rick Green. In support of White's
motion for summary judgment, White provided evidence by affidavit and deposition
testimony establishing that Green did not light the fire that spread to Poteet's sawmill.
Justice Durrant, writing for the unanimous Utah Supreme Court, reasoned that "because
the record contains no admissible evidence connecting White to the damages to Poteet's
sawmill, the District Court correctly entered summary judgment against him." Id. at ^j ] .

23. On appeal, Poteet had argued that there was a disputed issue of material fact as to
whether Green set the fire based on (1) Poteet's affidavit that a third party told him that
Green set the fire and (2) statements in Green's deposition where he admitted to starting
two (2) fires. After closely reviewing the record, the Supreme Court decided that Poteet's
affidavit was classic hearsay and therefore did not satisfy Rule 56(e) requirements.
Regarding the statements admitting to starting two (2) fires in his deposition, the Supreme
Court also ruled that this fact was insufficient to give rise to an inference that Green
started the fire that spread to Poteet's property. The record contained evidence of at least
three (3) fires, thus Green's admission to starting two (2) fires was insufficient to give
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Like Poteet, PRS LLC failed to raise a material dispute of fact with admissible
evidence in the record of the proceedings below. The alleged lease agreement was
considered by the Trial Court in its original Ruling but the Trial Court found that it was
not material or relevant because PRS LLC is not formally a party to the alleged lease
agreement and Ray is not obligated to deal with PRS LLC based on any terms expressed
therein. PRS LLC did not submit any affidavits or admissible evidence in opposition to
Ray's SJ Motion and the Trial Court properly granted Ray's SJ Motion.
B. The Trial Court properly exercised its discretion by declining to grant PRS
LLC*s Motion to Reconsider,
After the Trial Court granted Ray's SJ Motion, PRS LLC filed a Motion to
Reconsider supported by an Affidavit of William Lauf dated November 14, 2006 (herein
"Lauf Reconsideration Affidavit"'). The standard of review on appeal of a Trial Court's
grant of summary judgment is correction of error with no deference given to the Trial
Court's ruling. See, Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999).
However, a Trial Courfs consideration of a motion to reconsider summary judgment is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, which grants deference to the Trial
Court and should only be reversed if the ruling is "so unreasonable that it can be
classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion." See, Timm v.
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1996); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d

rise to an inference that one (1) of the two (2) fires was the fire that damaged Poteet's
sawmill. Thus, the Trial Court is permitted to take a close look at the record evidence and
determine whether any evidence creates a disputed issue of material fact, without being
required to make any credibility determinations.
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1306, 1312 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (review of Rule 54(b) motion is within the sound
discretion of the Trial Court, and will be reviewed for abuse of discretion).
In Trembly. Judge Davis identified six (6) factors the Court may consider in
determining a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration:
"A court can consider several factors in determining the
propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling. These may include,
but are not limited to. when (1) the matter is presented in a
"different light'' or under "different circumstances;" (2) there
has been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the court does
not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its
own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately brief when first
contemplated by the court. State v. O We/7, 848 P.2d 694, 694
n. 2 (Utah App.), cert denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, at 1311. 24
In PRS LLC's Appeal Brief, it does not identify any of the six (6) Trembly factors
or argue how the Trial Court erred in its exercise of discretion. The only factor that PRS
LLC potentially argued in its Appeal Brief is "new evidence" in the form of Lauf s
Reconsideration Affidavit."5 However, upon review of PRS LLC's Reconsideration

24. Neither PRS LLC's Motion to Reconsider nor PRS LLC's supporting Memorandum
identified the first three (3) Trembly factors in support of its request for reconsideration.
R. 369-388. In PRS LLC's Motion to Reconsider, PRS LLC premised its request on
factor 4 (manifest injustice) and factor 5 (court needs to correct its errors). R. 387.
Although PRS LLC's Memorandum also identified factor 6 (issues inadequately briefed)
as a basis for relief, PRS LLC presented no substantive argument on this factor in its
Memorandum below. Id.
25. Lauf s Reconsideration Affidavit is contradictory to Mr. Lauf s prior deposition
testimony and should be disregarded by the Court under the "sham affidavit rule." See,
Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-1173 (Utah 1983) ("the purpose of summary
judgment is not to weigh the evidence. But when a party takes a clear position in a
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Motion. Memorandum and Lauf s Reconsideration Affidavit the Trial Court properly
exercised its discretion and declined to reconsider its SJ Ruling in light of PRS LLC's
failure to demonstrate any entitlement to relief under the Trembly factors.

deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue
of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition, unless he can provide an
explanation of the discrepancy'*); Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, Inc.. 773 P_2d
401, 403 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). For example:
1.
In Lauf s deposition, he testified that the only agreement between
Pipe Renewal Service, Inc. [PRS Corporation] and Pipe Renewal Service.
LLC [PRS LLC] was an equipment lease from PRS Corporation to the
Defendant Pipe Renewal, LLC (Lauf Deposition p. 27-29) R. 411-413. In
Lauf s Affidavit, he later claimed that there is an agreement between PRS
Corporation and PRS LLC authorizing PRS LLC to occupy and use the
leased premises. (Lauf Reconsideration Affidavit at ^| 7). R. 377.
2.
In Lauf s deposition, he testified that he orally assigned the alleged
lease with PRS Corporation to PRS LLC. (Lauf Deposition p. 68 - 69) R.
411-413. However, in his affidavit, Lauf later stated that PRS Corporation
is the lessee, and PRS LLC occupies the premises with the agreement and
authority of PRS Corporation. (Lauf Reconsideration Affidavit % 2 and 7).
R. 376-377.
3.
In Lauf s deposition, he testified that the only asset of PRS Corporation was
the equipment leases. (Lauf Deposition p. 25 - 26) R. 414-415. Lauf further
testified that all of the receipts for service performed in 2006 were deposited in
PRS LLC's account not PRS Corporation. Id. In his affidavit, Lauf later stated
that PRS Corporation maintains ownership of all assets and the LLC only operates
the business. (Lauf Reconsideration Affidavit ^ 6). R. 377.
Lauf s Reconsideration Affidavit thus appears to be a sham that did not create a
basis for the Trial Court to exercise its discretion or to reverse its correct Ruling and the
Trial Court properly declined PRS LLC's invitation to do so. Ray submits this Court
should likewise disregard Lauf s Reconsideration Affidavit as a basis to create an issue of
disputed fact.
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m
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
RAY HIS UNPAID INCREASED RENT AS
DAMAGES PROVIDED BY THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER STATUTE
A. The Trial Court properly awarded Ray his unpaid rent as damages provided by
the Unlawful Detainer Statute.
Utah law clearly provides for damages upon determining a tenant is in unlawful
detainer in the form of unpaid rent and treble damages:
U.C.A. § 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent - Immediate enforcement - Treble damages.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a
jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy,
if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer
is after default in the payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided
in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed
C2

under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c),

and for reasonable

26. The Unlawful Detainer Statute was amended by the Utah Legislature in 2007 and
again in 2008. The relevant changes include (1) the "lease signer" as a party defendant
changes in § 78-36-7 previously addressed at footnote 8 at p. 16 hereinabove, and (2)
changes regarding attorney's fees in § 78-36-10, identified as follows:
wt

78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate
enforcement - Treble damages.
(l)(a) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default.
(b) A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for
the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5.
(c) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the
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attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or
agreement." (1994) (Emphasis supplied).
judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(d) (i) A forfeiture under Subsection (l)(c) does not release a defendant
from any obligation for payments on a lease for the remainder of the
lease's term,
(ii) Subsection (l)(d)(i) does not change any obligation on either party to
mitigate damages.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon
the defendant's default shall also assess the damages resulting to the
plaintiff from any of the following;
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waster of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the [amount of rent] amounts due under the contract, if the
alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the [payment of rent]
payment of amounts due under the contract; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections
78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a)
through [(c)] (e) and for reasonable [attorneys'] attorney fees[,if they are
provided for in the lease or agreement].
(4)(a) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer, execution upon the
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment.
(b) In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (2007) (2007 amendment identified by
underlining and strikethroughs)
In the 2007 amendments, at subsection (2)(d), the Legislature clarified that both rent
and "any amounts due" after unlawful detainer constitute damages under subsection (d)
clarifying its intent that trebled damages are to include damages identified in section 2(a)
through (e). Finally, the Legislature broadened the Trial Court's authority to award
reasonable attorney's fees in the absence of a written lease agreement by providing for
attorney's fees. Since the 2007 amendments were not in effect at the time of this
Unlawful Detainer action, the substantive amendments, including attorney's fees under §
78-36-10(3) as well as the party defendant changes under § 78-36-7 do not apply in the
case at bar. To the extent that PRS LLC's Appeal Brief relies upon the subsequent
statutory enacments, Ray respectfully submits this Court should disregard the same.
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In the Trial Court's SJ Ruling dated November L 2006, and Reconsideration
Ruling dated Febmary 1, 2007, the Trial Court properly determined that PRS LLC was in
unlawful detainer of the Property. It is undisputed that PRS LLC has, subsequent to the
Court's SJ Ruling, vacated the property.27 R. 664; R. 821. Contrary to PRS LLC's
assertions, there is no statutory or case law

requirement that an order of restitution is a

necessary prerequisite to the entry of damages

for unlawful detainer. Ray respectfully

27. PRS LLC could have certainly mitigated its damages by complying with the Three
Day Notice and immediately vacated the premises. However, PRS LLC chose to sit back
and let the damages accrue, knowing the risk of treble damages. Thus, PRS LLC should
not now be heard to complain about the amount of trebled damages. Furthermore, the
LJnlawful Detainer Statute provides the landlord with the optional remedy to post a
possession bond and obtain immediate occupancy of the premises so long as the tenant
does not file a counter bond. See. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 (1987). However, the
possession bond process is permissive and not mandatory because the Legislature used
the permissive language "may"' as opposed to the mandatory "shall." Id.; See also, State
v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (It is a general rule of statutory
constitution that the legislative use of the word "may" is permissive). Had the Legislature
been concerned with the accrual of damages during litigation, it certainly could have
placed a cap on the amount of treble damages, or made the posting of a possession bond
mandatory, but it chose not to do so. The 2007 Legislative amendments also support
Ray's position on these issues.
28. Id. PRS LLC cites no case law from our Utah Appellate Courts to support its
arguments on this issue.
29. The "rent" vs. "damages** dichotomy relied on by PRS LLC is irrelevant to the case
at bar. The statutory distinction between "rent" and "damages" for the purposes of an
unlawful detainer action that "rent" constitutes rent which accrues before termination of
the tenancy, and "damages" include, in part, rent which accrues after the tenancy has been
terminated by the Three Day Notice required by statute. See, Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell,
770 P.2d 1022, 1025-1026 (Utah Ct.App. 1999). Since Ray undisputedly served proper
notice on PRS LLC under the Unlawftil Detainer Statute (R. 165; R. 177; R. 340-343.)
and all of the rent/damages sought accrued after the Three Day Notice, the entire amount
of rent sought by Ray qualifies as damages which are required to be trebled under the
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submits that the PRS LLC's reading of the Unlawful Detainer statute (to require an order
of restitution as a prerequisite to the entry of an award for damages) would render the
statute meaningless because it would preclude any landlord from obtaining damages if the
tenant fought the litigation but then vacated the premises just before final judgment is
rendered. See, Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Co., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996)
(statutory enactments are to be construed to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful). In essence, a tenant could "litigate and vacate" just before the trial under
PRS LLC's interpretation of the Unlawful Detainer statute and occupy the premises "rent
free" without having to suffer a judgment for unpaid rent accruing after service of a Three
Day Notice to Pay or Vacate. The plain language of the Unlawful Detainer statute,
however, provides for mandatory damages against a tenant resulting from its unlawful
detainer and Ray respectfully submits that PRS LLC's strained reading of the Unlawful
Detainer Statute should be rejected by this Court. See, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(3)
(1994), cited hereinabove at pages 32-33.
Further, PRS L L C s reliance on Perkins v. Spencer, 243 P.2d 446 (Utah 1952) is
misplaced. Perkins is a landmark case in Utah concerning the legal standards applicable
to the vendor's forfeiture of a real estate purchase contract and the concomitant
enforceability of liquidated damages provisions contained therein - an issue that is not

statute.
Thus, under the plain language of § 78-36-10(3), a judgment for unlawful detainer
shall include an award of damages including rent ($88,000.00) plus trebled damages
($264,000.00) as the rent after notice is a statutorily defined damage.
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pertinent to the case at bar. Moreover, inconsistent with PRS LLC's assertion, Ray's
counsel could not locate a single case that cites to Perkins for the proposition that a court
should award nominal damages in an unlawful detainer action. Lastly, Perkins is
factually distinguishable from the case at bar because Perkins involved a husband and
wife who were both parties to a written real estate purchase contract with their vendor. In
Perkins, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the parties conceded that both the husband
and wife were in actual occupancy of the premises reasoning that:
"[Tjhere is nothing to indicate that he had abandoned the
premises, or that the marital unity of the parties had been
severed. The fact appears to be the contrary.. .So long as he
remained in possession, it is difficult to see how the Spencers
could be damaged by the fact that Mrs. Perkins remained
there/* Id. at 474.
In the case at bar, PRS LLC is not a party to any alleged contract/written lease but
claims to be a mere temporary incidental third party beneficiary of an alleged lease (R.
385) - a status that is a legal nullity under Holmes Development, L L C , ^j 53. Finally, the
record is bereft of any evidence that PRS Corporation was in actual possession of the
property during the time period damages are requested. 30

30. Despite PRS LLC's counsel's valiant attempts to testify on PRS LLC's behalf
throughout its Appeal Brief by repeatedly claiming that PRS Corporation was in actual
occupation of the premises at the time of commencement of the unlawful detainer action,
PRS LLC has not cited any competent evidence in the record below that the PRS
Corporation was in possession of the Property at the time of the commencement of the
unlawful detainer action. In fact, the only citation to the record below that PRS LLC
includes is at p. 6 & 7 of its Appeal Brief to the Record at pages 382-383, 184, 252 and
872 at p. 9. The Record at 382-383 is PRS LLC's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration, and does not constitute
competent evidence as discussed in fn. 7 at page 16 hereinabove. The Record at 184 and
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252 are exhibit dividers and are irrelevant. Finally, the Record at 872, p. 9 is a portion of
the transcript of the oral argument before the Trial Judge and references to PRS LLC's
counsel's argument once again is insufficient to constitute competent evidence.
William L. Lauf has filed two (2) affidavits in this matter, but at no time has Mr. Lauf
testified, under oath, that PRS Corporation was in actual possession of the Property
during the relevant time period. Furthermore, Lauf s Reconsideration Affidavit appears to
suggest that PRS Corporation was not, in fact, occupying the property, as follows:
"8. I am confused as to the application of an eviction order against the
LLC. Since the lawsuit did not name the Corporation, it seems, in the
event of an order against the LLC, the Corporation could merely terminate
the equipment lease and assume operatorship of the business from the
LCC thus leaving the operating business at the lease premises under the
Lease Agreement (Exhibit "A") operating business as usual." Lauf s
Reconsideration Affidavit. (Emphasis supplied). R. 377.
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ARGUMENT ON
CROSS-APPELLANT
RAY HUNTING'S APPEAL

ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPELLANT RAY HUNTING'S APPEAL
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING
TO AWARD RAY STATUTORILY
MANDATED TREBLE DAMAGES
A. Ray was entitled to treble damages under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (1994).
As previously discussed in Argument III at pages 32-37 hereinabove, upon a Trial
Court's determination of unlawful detainer, Utah law provides for an award of damages
in the form of unpaid rent and treble damages:
"U.C.A. § 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damaged,
and rent - Immediate enforcement - Treble damages.
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a
jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the
damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy,
if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at trial;
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer
is after default in the payment of rent; and
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided
in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for
the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for reasonable
attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or
agreement." (1994) (Emphasis supplied).
Ray properly raised PRS LLC's monthly rent from $2,000.00 to $7,500.00 per
month effective September 1, 2005. 3] On September 16, 2005, having received only

31. Under Utah law, the failure to object to a rent increase while continuing in possession
constitutes an agreement to the increased rent. See, Belnap v. Fox, 251 P. 1073, 1075-6
(Utah 1926). Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, PRS LLC never responded or objected to
either the Rent Increase Notice or the Three Day Notice. R. 156; R. 165-66; R. 178. See,
Plaintiffs September Affidavit at \ 14.
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partial rent in the amount of $2,000.00 from Defendant. Plaintiff caused a Three Day
Notice to be served upon Defendant and Ray filed his Complaint for Eviction, Damages
for Unpaid Rent, Treble Damages and Other Relief on October 19, 2005. The Trial
Court determined in its SJ Ruling (November 1, 2006) and Reconsideration Ruling
(February 1, 2007) that PRS LLC was in unlawful detainer of the Property and awarded
Ray partial summary judgment. R. 340-343; R. 598-599. The Trial Court subsequently
granted Ray's Motion for Entry of Damages, in part, by awarding Ray unpaid rent in the
amount of $88,000.00 (R. 818-822; R. 840-843) calculated as follows:
Unpaid Rent Calculation
Rent at $7,500.00 per month for 16 months
(September 2005 - December 2006):
Less Rent Paid: $2,000.00 per month for 16 months:
Total Unpaid Rent:

$ 120,000.00
$ 32,000.00
$ 88,000.00

However, Ray's total damages include trebled damages which are calculated as
follows:
Total Damages Calculation
General Damages for Unpaid Rent:
Treble Damages
Filing Fee:
Sheriffs Fees (Summons & Complaint October 27, 2005):
Total Damages:

$ 88,000.00
$264,000.00
$
155.00:
$
19.50
$352,174.50

B. Ray's Requested Damages are Reasonable
32. The Trial Court also awarded Ray his costs including the filing fee and sheriffs
service fee. R. 818-822; R. 840-843.
33. R. 175-179; R. 611-615. See, Ray's SJ Affidavit at Wl 10, 15, 16, and Ray's
Damages Affidavit dated May 2, 2007 at f 2-3.
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Ray's Damages are calculated at a monthly rental rate of $7,500.00 per month.
Ray submits that the requested $7,500.00 rental rate was below fair market rental value
for the Property and is therefore reasonable. Pursuant to the Trial Court's suggestion
during Oral Argument on January 30, 2007 (R. 872 at p. 33-38), Ray had an appraisal of
the Property conducted by an MAI appraiser, Paul Throndsen. In Mr. Throndsen's
professional opinion, he appraised the monthly fair market rental value of the Property to
then be in the sum of $13,450.00 per month. See, Throndsen Affidavit at ^ 3. R. 600709; R. 644-645. Since Ray's damage calculations were based on less than the fair
market value rental rate for the Property, Ray submits that his requested treble damages
were reasonable because those damages are less than the actual damages suffered by Ray.
Furthermore, PRS LLC did not present any contrary evidence, whatsoever, regarding the
rental value of the Property.
Additionally, Mr. Throndsen appraised the fair market value of the Properly to
then be $1,600,000.00. See, Throndsen Affidavit at ^ 3. R 600-709; R. 644-645. Our
Utah appellate courts have previously noted a " 1 % rule" as a baseline of the minimum
fair rental value of property. The Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Road Comm'n v.
Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 839 (Utah 1984) held that:
"As a rule of thumb, monthly rental value is deemed to be a
sum equal to one percent of the market value." Id.
Then Chief Justice Ellett, dissenting in Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 374
(Utah 1977), again noted that 1% of the fair market value of the property is a minimum
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fair rental value for property:
"The trial court erred in its findings relative to the damages
sustained by the defendant. One of the principal elements of
benefits received by the purchaser in possession of land is the
reasonable rental value thereof. The trial court made no
finding regarding that value. The purchaser had possession of
the land for some thirteen months. There is a rule of thumb,
generally recognized, that the rental value of property is one
percent of the value for each month's use; also, there was
testimony that the reasonable rental was between $1,500 and
$1,700 per month. It thus would appear that since the value
was $170,000 (sale price), the rental value would be between
$1,500 and $1,700 per month; and for thirteen months the
rental value should be in the neighborhood of $20,000 or
more. This figure should be substituted for the interest figure
used by the trial court. This would decrease the loss to the
purchaser by more than $5,000 as found by the trial court.
The amount of purchaser's damage then should be $3,845
instead of $8,845 as found by the court. This damage is only
2.2% of the total sales price.
In the case of Carlson v. Hamilton a defaulting purchaser sued
to recover his excess payments which amounted to 9 lA % of
the purchase price. This court refused to allow recovery on
the ground that a loss of 9 Vi% was not enough to be shocking
to the conscience. If 9 XA % is not shocking, how can 2.2% be
considered so? The Plaintiffs standing to bring the action
was neither raised nor considered in that case." Id. Chief
Justice Ellett in dissent (emphasis supplied).
The Property is valued at $1,600,000.00, thus based on the 1% rule, the minimum
fair market rental value of the Property is arguably $16,000.00 per month. Since the
monthly fair market rental value of the Property is in the $13,450.00 to $16,000.00 range,
Ray's requested treble damages were reasonable in all respects and the Trial Court erred
by not awarding Ray's requested treble damages.
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C. The Unlawful Detainer Statute Mandates Trebled Damages be awarded in this
case.
In the Courf s Final Order, it denied Ray's request for trebled damages on the basis
that Ray's damages were limited by the increased rental amount because a third party
might arguably have a right to possession of the Property. The Trial Court's refusal to
award treble damages is. however contrary to the clear and unambiguous language of the
Unlawful Detainer Statute. In Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property
Management, Inc., 2006 UT 45, ^] 11-13 143 P.3d 278, the Utah Supreme Court held that
trebled damages are mandatory once unlawful detainer of the premises is established. See
also, Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 678-9 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (reversing trial court's
denial of trebled damages in unlawful detainer action, holding trebled damages under §
78-36-10(3) were mandatory), citing Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930) (holding
that it is "mandatory upon the Court to render judgment for three (3) times the amount of
damages"); Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025-6 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (holding
trebled damages under § 78-36-10 were mandatory). The Utah Supreme Court in
Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 208, 214 (Utah 1930) held that the rental value during the
unlawful detainer period is the minimum amount of damages that shall be trebled/4 Ray

34. PRS LLC's reliance on Forrester for the purpose that only nominal damages should
be awarded is misplaced. See, PRS Appeal Brief at p. 20. The Utah Supreme Court in
Forrester upheld the award of damages noting the rule that:
"Manifestly, the loss of the use of the premises-in other words, the loss of
the rental value-is a damage suffered by the person from whom the property
is unlawfully detained. The authorities generally so announce the rule.
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submits this Court should reverse the Trial Court's Final Order and remand with
directions for entry of Judgment in favor of Ray and against PRS LLC in the sum of
$352,174.50 as sought by Ray below.
D. Prior to the 2007 amendment there was no requirement that any contracting
party be named as a defendant in an unlawful detainer action.
Prior to the 2007 Legislative amendments discussed hereinabove, our Utah
Appellate Courts have consistently held that a contracting party was not required to be
named as a party defendant in an unlawful detainer action unless he/she was in actual
occupation of the property at the time of commencement of the unlawful detainer action.
The first case is Pearce v. Shurtz, 270 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1954). In Pearce. the original
contracting parties were Ivan Call who sold a ranch to Frank Lewellen. Mr. Call
exchanged a bond for a deed and a promissory note. Mr. Call sold his interest to Mr.
Pearce and Mr. Lewellen sold his interest to Mr. Shurtz. Mr. Shurtz then transferred onehalf (Vi) of his interest of his interest to Mr. Wright and Mr. Wright sold his one-half (V2)
and Mr. Shurtz sold his other one-half (V2) to Mr. Johnson, leaving Mr. Johnson with the
entire interest that was originally Mr. Lewellen's sole interest in the property. Mr.

Thus, in 26 C. J. 863, section 136, where the cases will be found collected,
the rule is stated in this language:
'"Where under the statute damages are recoverable, the value of the
rents and profits of the land is an element of damage which is
generally to be taken into consideration, without regard to the nature
or extent of the right or title by which possession was held, and
according to some decisions this is the measure of damages.'"
To the same effect are Flournoy v. Everett, 51 CaL App. 406, 196 P. 916;
Pfitzer v. Candeias, 53 Cal. App. 737, 200 P. 839." Id at 212.
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Johnson then defaulted on the promissory note and became a tenant at will. Mr. Pearce
sued and brought an unlawful detainer action against Messers. Shurtz. Wright, and
Johnson but did not include the original contracting party Mr. Lewellen. The Utah
Supreme Court ruled that the failure to give notice or make demand upon Mr. Lewellen,
the original contracting party, did not make the unlawful detainer action premature
reasoning as follows:
"Appellant contends that since Lewellen was the only person
liable on the promissory note demand for payment should
have been upon him. That he should have been notified of the
forfeiture for default, and that he should have been joined as
party defendant in a suit for possession based on the
forfeiture. This contention might be sound if the action were
other than unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer, however, is
an action to remove a tenant from possession and is primarily
against the person in possession. It is not similar to a quiet
title action wherein anyone with any interest should be joined.
Neither is it similar to an action upon the promissory note.
Title 1044-60-7, U.C.A., 1943 provides:
No person other than the tenant of the premises, and
subtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the
premises when the action is commenced, need be made
party defendant in the proceeding, nor shall any
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be nonsuited, for the
nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a
party defendant;***'
This provision is indicative of the nature of the unlawful
detainer action and of the fact that failure to serve demand or
notice upon Lewellen in this case did not result in the action
being premature." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of necessary parties in unlawful
detainer action again in the case of Tanner v. Lawler, 305 P.2d 882 (Utah 1957). Earl
Tanner defaulted on his mortgage, there was a foreclosure action and Mr. Tanner
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thereafter exercised his right of redemption. Walter Reichert purchased the property at
the Sheriffs sale and sublet the property to W.C. Lawler and his wife Laura Lawler.
When Mr. Tanner redeemed the property he brought an action against the tenants in
possession, the Lawlers, because they did not have a contract to rent the property from
him and they were occupants on a month-to-month tenancy. Mr. Reichert intervened in
the unlawful detainer action and, even though Mr. Reichert had not been served with a
notice to quit, because he had appeared in the proceeding and the Lawlers had been
properly served under the statute, and the Trial Court properly evicted the Lawlers
awarded treble damages against both the Lawlers and Mr. Reichert. The Supreme Court
upheld the Trial Court's award of treble damages, reasoning that based on the plain
language of the statute:
"By the terms 'when it appears that any of the parties
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment must be
rendered against them' the statute indicated that a person
appearing in this kind of a case and asserting that the actual
occupant is rightfully in possession as his tenant will be
subject to a personal judgment against him for treble damages
if the court decides his claim is invalid/* Id. at 887 (fn
omitted). 35
35. Importantly, the Unlawful Detainer statute in 1957 had one word change different
from what it was in 2005. In 1957 the statute provided that:
"nor shall any proceeding abate...but when it appears that any
of the party served with process or appearing in the
proceedings are guilty judgment must be rendered judgment
must be rendered against them...'' (emphasis supplied)
In the 1957 version of the statute, the statute provided that no other person other
than the tenant, and a subtenant if there is one in actual occupation of the premises "need"
be made a party, wherein the 2005 version provides that no other person then the tenant
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In the third case Pickney v. Snidmen. 2000 UT App 275 (unpublished
memorandum decision) cites to the Pearce v. Shurtz case suggesting that it is still good
law. In Pickney. Joe Pickney purchased a parcel of property that had been foreclosed
upon and sued the person who was occupying the premises. The Trial Court dismissed
the unlawful detainer action finding that Snidmen was not the real party in interest but the
Court of Appeals reversed and held that in an unlawful detainer action the appropriate
party to be sued in and unlawful detainer action is the person who is occupying the
premises.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that in unlawful detainer actions the
appropriate party to be sued is the tenant in possession. Ray respectfully submits the
Court should enter an order awarding Ray trebled damages in the amount of $264,000.00.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DECLINING
TO GRANT RAY'S SJ MOTION ON THE
DAMAGE ISSUE ABSENT THE
PRESENTATION OF ANY FACTUAL
DISPUTE BY PRS LLC

and subtenant if there is one in possession "shall" be made a party to defendant in the
proceeding. By using the word shall, the Legislature made it mandatory as to who the
parties defendant would be. PRS LLC's argument about whether or not the Rule 19 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure applies, dovetails with the statutes in whether or not there
are indispensable parties. The Tanner Court rejected PRS LLC's position because the
statute explicitly provided that Ray as the landlord did not need to make anybody else a
party defendant. The Legislature in the 2005 Unlawful Detainer statute went one step
further by providing that only the identified parties who are in actual occupation of the
property are the ones who will be subject to an unlawful detainer action.
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On November 1. 2006. the Trial Court entered its SJ Ruling granting Ray's SJ
Motion, in pari, and determining that PRS LLC was in unlawful detainer of the Property
but. sua sponte, reserving the amount of damages for further hearing. R. 340-343; R. 646.
On February 1, 2007, the Trial Court entered its Ruling and Order denying Defendant's
Motion for Reconsideration, and affirming its prior Summary Judgment Ruling, but again
reserving the issue of damages for future hearing. R. 594-599; R. 645.
At no stage in the proceedings below did PRS LLC present any competent
evidence or legal arguments that Ray's requested damages were excessive or
unwarranted. In fact, had the Trial Court awarded Ray his requested damages in the
Court's November 1, 2006, Summary Judgment Order, PRS LLC would not have been
permitted to continue to drag out the litigation for an additional eight (8) months with its
Motion for Reconsideration.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Ray respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Trial Court's decision awarding
summary judgment in Ray*s favor and against PRS LLC, determining that PRS LLC was
in unlawful detainer of the premises, and awarding Ray $88,000.00 in damages for rent.
This Court should, however, reverse the Trial Court's order denying trebled damages and
remand for entry of an additional judgment in Ray's favor for trebled damages in the
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amount of $264,000.00. Unless this Court intends to grant Ray the full relief he seeks
herein. Ray respectfully requests that this Court schedule oral argument on this matter.
DATED this ^J 5 -

day of

flrj',}

, 2008.

Respectfully submitted,

hillipWDj^r,
Phillip
W . D $ r , Esq.
Carey A. Seager, Esq.
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